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Some Results of the Economic Transformation in East 
Germany and their Possible Relevance for Korea 
Bernd Martens∗ 
Abstract: »Einige Ergebnisse der ökonomischen Transformation in Ostdeutsch-
land und ihre mögliche Relevanz für Entwicklungen in Korea«. The outcomes of 
the transformation of the GDR economy is described in regard to four topics: 
reproduction of managerial elites, due to functional necessities; short windows 
of opportunity of reaching a leading position at the top level of companies in 
the new economic order; fast role taking of the new managerial elites who of-
ten had a professional background as cadres in the socialist economy; and an 
accelerated change of social structure. The results refer to different surveys 
among entrepreneurs and executive of industrial firms in East and West Ger-
many. The data were collected by the research project A2 “Economic elites in 
enlarged Europe” of the Collaborative Research Centre 580 at the universities 
of Halle and Jena, and they can additionally be compared with similar surveys 
among Polish and Hungarian respondents. The results are assessed in reference 
to three transformation paths which distinguished countries that have under-
gone after the collapse of the global socialist economic system. Eventually the 
relevance of the outcomes is considered for the North Korean case. 
Keywords: Transformation, economic elites, business leaders, circulation of 
elites. 
1.  Introduction1 
In 1991 the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) was 
dissolved. This decision marked the visible collapse of the experiment that 
attempted at establishing a global socialist economic system (Stone 1996). 
During the following years, the former member states of the Comecon under-
went quite different fates, for example: the Soviet Union and Poland (founding 
members in 1949), Vietnam (Comecon member since 1978), or North Korea 
(no membership, but observer status). Nevertheless, the economic transfor-
mations of former Comecon countries can roughly be classified into three 
different paths that are used in the following as an interpretative scheme. The 
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overall question is whether the German unification process and the economic 
transformations of selected East European countries provide some “lessons” for 
conceivable changes on the Korean peninsula, despite large differences be-
tween the countries (Frank 2014, 347 et seq.).  
Therefore the transformation of the former GDR economy is outlined in this 
paper and its relevance to hypothetical future changes in Korea is discussed. 
The chosen approach is twofold: information on the economic development as 
well as data about East German business leaders are used. The second type of 
information refers to different surveys which were conducted by the research 
project A2 “Economic elites in enlarged Europe” of the Collaborative Research 
Centre 580 at the universities of Halle and Jena.  
The outcomes of German economic transformation and additional infor-
mation about other East European transformation countries are summarized 
with regard to five topics:  
- the development of economies in different (former) socialist countries are 
summarized in three transformation paths; 
- the reproduction rates of economic elites were relatively high and showed 
similar patterns in all former East European socialist countries; 
- the windows of opportunity to reach the first hierarchical level in East Ger-
man firms were rather short at the beginning of transformation; 
- the comparisons of population and economic elites indicate a successful 
“role taking” of the latter; and 
- the economic transformation processes were always connected with social 
“side effects” like growing inequality and social closure (Ther 2014 offers a 
synopsis of the various East European developments). 
As a concluding remark, the East German situation after the economic transfor-
mation delivers a background for hypotheses concerning the Korean situation. 
2.  Data 
During the research of the Collaborative Research Centre 580 computer assist-
ed telephone interviews were carried out with executives and entrepreneurs in 
companies in selected East and West German regions, for the first time in 
2002. The sample included independent enterprises of the German manufactur-
ing industry with 50 to 1,000 employees. These relatively small firm sizes 
reflected the recent industrial structure in East Germany with a lack of large 
corporations. The standardized questionnaire comprised questions regarding 
the characteristics of the companies and the persons responsible on the first 
organizational level (entrepreneurs, managing directors, executives, or CEOs). 
Personal data of the business leaders (social and educational background, ca-
reers, perceptions of their role in society, assessments of industrial relations 
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and opinions about relationship between state and business) were collected and 
can be correlated with organizational or other independent variables. The first 
survey in 2002 was replicated twice in 2005 and in 2010 following a panel 
design. The last German survey was complemented by identical data collec-
tions of our Polish and Hungarian research partners (Bluhm et al. 2014). Con-
sequently, some of the results on East German business leaders can also com-
paratively be discussed. 
3.  Outcomes of Economic Transformation 
3.1  Transformation Paths 
German reunification is embedded in the political upheavals in Eastern Europe. 
It is, therefore a special case of political, social, and economic change. In the 
literature the following aspects are taken into consideration to describe the 
economic transformation in Eastern European countries in the 1990s: 
- the position of the communist party (still in power or replaced by new polit-
ical agents); 
- the time span in which political changes took place; 
- the type of exchange of economic and political elites; 
- the conditions and, in particular, the restrictions under which the privatiza-
tion of former public property had been carried out. 
The economic transformations of the former socialist countries in Eastern Eu-
rope occurred in diverses patterns. However, for analytical purposes they are 
classified into two groups of countries.  
Countries which are characterized by an abrupt political change and rela-
tively unregulated conditions of the privatization processes are Russia, 
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The socio-political consequence in 
these cases was that “insiders,” who were mainly former cadres, could get 
control over large economic units and were able to acquire additional proper-
ties. Oligarchic structures emerged and have gained a substantial impact on the 
economy in these countries. These countries followed transformation path A. 
Separated from this path of economic transformation, the Czech Republic, 
the Baltic States, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany can be denoted as a 
second group of countries (transformation path B), where the political change 
was also carried out quickly, but at the same time more or less transparent rules 
governed the conditions of transfer of state’s property. Partially, these regula-
tions led to a systematic discrimination of “insiders.” This held especially true 
in the case of East Germany.  
The German reunification was an extreme case of transformation. The mon-
etary union with the Federal Republic of Germany comprised a “shock thera-
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py” for the GDR economy which suddenly became a part of global competi-
tion. With the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the scope of 
application of the federal constitution, West German institutions were also 
introduced at one stroke. At the national level, an elite exchange occurred and a 
conversion of former political power into economic power was not possible, 
since the question of ownership of public property had already been solved by 
the establishment of the privatization agency Treuhandanstalt in 1990. It 
quickly brought about a high turnover of elites in the economy, because it 
managed the takeover of firms by strategic (Western) investors and systemati-
cally obstructed or outright prevented buyouts by East German management in 
favour of West German buyers. Informal relationships or family ties did not 
matter in the privatization, so a strategy “from plan to clan,” which could be 
observed in other transition countries, was ruled out (Gergs and Pohlmann 
1999, 247; see also Fritsch and Wyrwich 2016, in this HSR Forum). 
In the group of countries that followed transformation B, different forms of 
privatization were used: direct sales to mainly West German or foreign inves-
tors (in East Germany, Estonia, and Hungary); a mass privatization and strate-
gic sales in the Czech Republic as well as an insider privatization combined 
with a subsequent mass privatization; and direct sales to investors in Poland 
(Bluhm et al. 2014; Ther 2014). 
Despite of this varying diversity over time and different ownership struc-
tures (for example, in Poland companies in state ownership play until today an 
important role), it can be stated, as a general result, that the economic transfor-
mation in these countries led to dependent market economies which suggests that 
the influence of foreign capital is large. In some cases even regional develop-
ments in dependent market economies depend on foreign companies due to their 
dominant position in the respective national economies (Bluhm et al. 2014). 
East Germany may be included in this group of countries, because, in this 
case, mainly West German investors bought companies. After reunification, 
these investors were formally no longer foreigners, but their functions were, 
nevertheless, similar to foreign investors in other former socialist countries of 
the second group of transition countries. Actually, the Treuhand policy, 
which fostered very fast and direct sales of assets to strategic (Western) in-
vestors, led to an even more extreme version of “dependent capitalism” than in 
the other post-socialist countries of East Central Europe. The important differ-
ence was, however, that the top positions of the larger privatized companies 
could much more easily be staffed especially with Western, that is, West Ger-
man, personnel (Bluhm 2010). Most of the large companies were subsidiaries 
of western or West German companies. Just one headquarter of a large manu-
facturing company is located in the formerly highly industrialized East Ger-
many, that is, in Jena, and only because there was a particular political support 
for this company. 
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In a rapid political change, a controlled privatization seems to promote the 
influence of foreign capital, that is, in fact relatively independent of the select-
ed type of privatization. By those regulations oligarchic structures as well as 
insider solutions can partially be prevented, but at the same time it supports the 
creation of “extended workbenches” under foreign control. In addition, it can 
foster sentiments of colonization among the domestic population. In regard to 
the elite constellation, the remaining essentially regional economic elites in the 
emerging dependent market economies were not able to maintain a decisive 
influence on the economy. It remains an open question to what extent this held 
true before the political upheaval, because in the socialist planned economies 
the claim of a primacy of politics always existed. 
Countries like China or Vietnam pursue a third transformation path called C. 
It differs from the previously mentioned paths A and B in the decisive feature 
that the traditionally ruling party still remains in power, although economic 
reforms took place in the past. The political class in these countries strives for 
the complete control of the transformation process that encompasses, for ex-
ample, the opening of certain markets, foreign investments, the allowance of 
entrepreneurial activities of the domestic population, or joint ventures. The still 
ruling political elites try to decouple political and economic reform processes, 
or in other words: The primacy of politics shall remain untouched. Economic 
reforms shall only occur in accord with political decisions and they shall never 
undermine the power of the ruling class. 
Experts on North Korea agree that since the end of the 1990s economic re-
forms were conducted in the country.  
In terms of economic life, there were some indications of change – and even 
the use of the taboo word ‘reform’ – in both the rhetoric and the observable 
reality of DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) life. Since the eco-
nomic crisis began to emerge in the early 1990s, long before the famine 
(1995-97), there had been signs of liberalization and the growth of local mar-
kets in the North Korean economy (Armstrong 2014, 58 et seq.). 
In 2002 “the most far-reaching economic changes” were established “since the 
regime was founded in 1948” (Armstrong 2014, 59).  
The actions by the state concerned rising wages, the food supply system, 
taxes, and a very strong currency devaluation. The domestic currency was 
reduced in relation to the dollar by 6,800 % (Frank 2014, 200). Some of the 
reforms failed and since 2005 an opposing trends of a “neo-conservative social-
ism” could be detected (Frank 2015, 568). But Frank (2014, 204) describes for 
example that planning, as an essential part of socialist economy, vanished in 
the North Korean public. Perhaps there are still economic plans, but they are 
not a particular subject of public perception, any longer.  
The 2002 reforms showed the limits of political interventions in North Ko-
rean economy; they produced, for instance, an immense inflation. In essence, 
they did not have the effects that were originally intended, but they had im-
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portant impacts or “side effects” on the society. Money obtained a growing 
influence on all aspects of life. Thereby it changed social relationships and 
established new societal inequalities (Frank 2015, 567). “North Korea is today 
no longer the same country as before the July reforms [in 2002]” (Frank 2014, 
232). It is supposed that these changes can best be described in terms of trans-
formation path C that presumably also meets the intentions of the ruling class 
in North Korea.  
3.2  Elite Reproduction 
The transformation in East Germany represents the extreme case of elite turno-
ver, since in fact a professional “counter-elite” was available in all sectors due 
to the German reunification. Simultaneously, the far-reaching institutional 
transfer which was involved in the reunification entailed transfer of top per-
sonnel from West to East especially in administration. In the middle of the 
1990s, the East German elites were underrepresented at a national level in 
comparison to the overall population: Of the 2,341 elite positions in politics, 
economics, science and culture, only 11.6 % (272) were occupied by East 
Germans (cf. Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997). The proportion of the East Ger-
man population is about one-fifth. Among the 180 largest companies listed in the 
DAX, just two chairpersons were born or socialized in the German Democratic 
Republic (Mau 2012).  
The Treuhand policy and the massive deindustrialization following the cur-
rency union in July 1990 led to a quick and dramatic structural change not only 
in branches but also in company size. The Treuhandanstalt already broke larger 
state-owned enterprises into smaller pieces in order to make the process of 
selling them easier; in addition, departments and smaller production sites 
looked for Western investors, contributing to the dissolution of bigger units. 
For the transformation of the economic elite, the downsizing of the East Ger-
man industry supported their “regionalization.” 
The first Treuhand director Detlev Karsten Rohwedder was in favour of a 
“head theory” which suggested the creation of an elite circulation. Thus, initial-
ly the (West German) directors of the privatized companies had to be appoint-
ed. Then – this was the conjecture – they would bring their “heads of the de-
partment” and their managers from the West with them (Pohlmann and Gergs 
1996, 77). This hypothesis did not come true. The East German labor market 
was rather uninteresting for West German executives that in the mid-1990s. 
The elite import in the field of economy was estimated to 11-14 % of all man-
agers (Pohlmann and Gergs 1996, 79). Later investigations of the Collaborative 
Research Center 580 showed that the proportion of business leaders with a 
West German origin was continuously at one-third in East German industrial 
firms during the period 2002-10. But also in these cases the remaining levels of 
hierarchy were clearly dominated by East German managers (Martens and 
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Lungwitz 2012). Therefore, the import of managerial staff from West Germany 
was more limited than originally expected. This rather supports the notions of 
an elite reproduction than an elite circulation. 
Nevertheless, studies about the fate of former economic elites, who had 
worked at the top levels of state conglomerates (Kombinate) in the GDR, found 
that aproximately 25 % of the former economic cadres retired during the first 
years of transformation. After ten years, however, 80 % of the still working 
persons were successfully busy in different economic fields. One fifth of them 
was entrepreneurs at that time and had founded a company. The largest propor-
tion of this group of former economic cadres (80 %) continued their careers in 
managerial positions. At least 40 % even found jobs at the very top level of 
company management during the 1990s (Schreiber et al. 2002, 141). In com-
parison to the general employment rates in different economic sectors, the 
personnel in the higher organizational strata had generally a better chance of 
keeping and finding adequate jobs after the historic upheaval than workers at 
lower organizational levels (Lutz and Grünert 1996, 85).  
In spite of a high elite turnover in the East German economy and the wide-
spread decline of its indigenous elite to the level of a “regional elite,” due to the 
reduction in size of the companies and the takeover of the remaining large state 
enterprises by multinational companies, the thesis of “vertical reproduction” is 
applicable here (cf. Pohlmann and Gergs 1999). This notion means that the 
economic transformation frequently offered the second hierarchy of economic 
cadres the possibility to continue their careers. Hatschikjan (1998, 258) de-
scribes the transformation process and the recruiting of new business elites 
during the early 1990s as “revolution of the deputy department chiefs” that was 
observable to some extent in all former socialist countries. 
The thesis of “vertical reproduction” of the economic elite is even more ap-
propriate to the East German case if one takes into account the founding of new 
companies during the economic transformation, which were often based on the 
ruins of the former state enterprises, although the Treuhandanstalt did not 
support management buyouts by preferential prices that were set for West 
German investors. Initial disadvantages faced by the former GDR management 
are still detectable more than two decades after unification. Larger companies 
in East Germany are more likely to have West German or foreign capital hold-
ers and West German executives. If East Germans do own shares, their hold-
ings are likely smaller.  
Nonetheless, there has been a remarkable continuity in career paths over-
arching the system collapse in some respect. Many “deputies” moved to the top 
level of firms. In 1989, those who made this move were approximately 40 
years old, principally engineers or technicians with a university degree and 
nearly all of them had already had leading positions in the GDR economy 
(Table 1). Around half of them made this step as shareholders, either as spin-
offs of former companies or founding their own new companies (cf. Martens 
HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  218 
2008). Only a few ever worked outside the economic sector – in this respect 
they resembled their West German counterparts.  
Table 1: Percentage of Business Leaders who had a Leading Position in 
Management before 1989, Differentiated to Regional Background 
Year of the 
survey 
Percentage of business leaders who had leading position in management 
before 1989 
East Germans West Germans 
2002 79.1 % 72.0 % 
2005 74.8 % 55.7 % 
2010 67.1 % 54.8 % 
Source: Management panel surveys, project SFB 580/A2. 
3.3  Short Window of Opportunity with a Long Shadow 
However, the chance of former economic cadres of getting first rank positions 
was limited with regard to the course of time. The window of opportunity was 
open during the first years after 1990, and then it closed.  
Kotthoff and Matthäi (1999, 100), in their study of economic transformation 
in East Germany, point to special types of entrepreneurs who had a profession-
al background in the GDR. They found among others “senior entrepreneurs” 
who took their opportunities to control a company at an unusually advanced 
age, as well as “entrepreneurs against their own will” who were forced by 
circumstances to follow a new profession, principally in order to avoid unem-
ployment (Matthäi 1996, 153-71). 
Figure 1: Distribution of Age, According to Regional Background 
 
Source: 3rd wave of the management panel survey in 2010, project SFB 580/A2. 
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entrepreneurs and executives which was still dominant 20 years after unifica-
tion had a professional background in the socialist economy of the GDR (Table 
1). The percentage of East German persons who had already reached leading 
positions before 1989 and was still in such positions in 2010 is 67 %. The cor-
responding figure for the West German sample is 55 %. In comparison to the 
data of the 2005 survey the differences are only minor. 
The age distributions of our respondents also illustrate the high proportion 
of “senior entrepreneurs” in East German management. At first glance, the 
difference between the mean ages of respondents seems to be rather small: 54.6 
years (East) and 52.5 years (West) and became smaller during the three panel 
waves (Martens 2008). But the difference is still statistically significant (t-test, 
p < 0.018), and, furthermore, the whole distributions are quite different (Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0.001, Figure 1).  
Older age groups occurred more often in East German top management. The 
ages of the largest cohort in the 2010 survey was between 35 and 40 years at 
the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast to the age structure of the East German 
sub-sample, the age distribution of the West German respondents is more “bal-
anced.” Persons who are younger than 45 years appear with larger frequencies. 
Due to the special age structure of managerial elites, a generational change in 
East German top-level management was originally expected during the first 
decade of the 21st century; however the older cohorts of former economic 
cadres have shown a large degree of resilience.  
Figure 2: Length of Time Spent at the Position Held at the Time of the Survey 
 
Source: 1st wave of the management panel survey in 2002, event history data, project SFB 
580/A2. 
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A second impression on career patterns is provided by a comparison of the 
duration of staying at the position that the respondents occupied in the year of 
the first panel survey (the following analyses refer to the event history data on 
careers that were only collected in 2002). The distributions of the East and 
West German respondents differ widely (Figure 2): A majority of East German 
executives and entrepreneurs apparently used rather short windows of opportu-
nities to obtain their positions at that time. These windows of opportunities 
only existed at the beginning of the 1990s and since then, these persons have 
remained rather immobile in their positions. The length of time spent at the 
position also correlates positively with ownership of company shares. 
A multivariate method (optimal matching of sequence data2 describing ca-
reers of East German respondents during the time frame 1981-2001) revealed 
that some of the economic elite’s current characteristics – such as age structure, 
job mobility, company ownership, and qualifications – were still influenced by 
the windows of opportunities that existed in the early 1990s. It was possible to 
summarize the careers of East German entrepreneurs and executives into three 
patterns of sequences of occupational states (jobs):  
1) The dominant career pattern could be circumscribed by the term “continu-
ousness.” Persons belonging to this type were essentially senior entrepre-
neurs and did not change company, but only their position. Executives and 
entrepreneurs of this career type had always been – before and after the uni-
fication – in the same economic organization. This held true for 53.6 % of 
the East German sample and it described the main structure of opportunities 
which were relevant for East German business elites in the beginning of the 
1990s: seeking their chances in the firm they already knew.  
2) A second group of persons, encompassing 27.0 % of the East German sam-
ple, reached the top-level of companies only by changing the firm or by 
founding a new one, also at the beginning of the 1990s. This group exhibited 
a different type of mobility and flexibility and it can be denoted as the 
founders.  
3) The last cluster includes respondents who were younger and who did not 
possess company shares. Their careers often showed them rising to top-level 
positions at the end of the 1990s. They seemed to represent a new genera-
tion of managers (Martens 2005, 225). 
Further analysis reveals that the career type essentially depended on the owner-
ship of companies. This held true especially for the first and second career 
pattern. The use of the windows of opportunities frequently implied the neces-
                                                             
2  The careers are regarded as sequences of states during a given time frame. All sequences are 
compared according to a special distance measure and classified by cluster analysis (Abbott 
and Tsay 2000). In our case, states are hierarchical positions and whether a person changes 
firm to get a new job. Optimal matching of career sequences leads to seven clusters for the 
East German respondents (Martens 2005, 218-25). 
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sity of buying company shares. Consequently, the percentage of owners among 
in East German business leaders were higher than among their West German 
counterpart, however, more often, they possessed only minority shares. 
Whereas in East Germany the generational change in domestic top man-
agement was rather small since the beginning of the transformation process, it 
was larger in Poland and Hungary. There we observe a significant impact of 
foreign capital on the speed of generational change. Age effects are especially 
promoted by subsidiaries in all countries. Therefore such companies that are 
totally owned by foreigners can be seen as a driving force of generational tran-
sition during the transformation. The same holds true for Poland and Hungary 
regarding companies that are owned by other companies and – in the Polish 
case – by companies which are run by employed managers. In other words, 
companies belonging to a larger conglomerate have younger employed top 
managers, especially in the case of foreign ownership. While in Poland and 
Hungary, according to the 2010 surveys, around one-third of the older “deputy 
generation” who began its career under socialism held top management posi-
tions in foreign owned companies (29.5 % and 31.3 %, respectively), this held 
true for 46.4 % of the younger generation of business leaders in Poland and 
even 66.7 % in Hungary. (The demarcation line between the younger and the 
older group was an age of 45 years.) The contrast was much weaker in Germa-
ny, because the percentage of East German business leaders in foreign-owned 
companies was particularly low in both the younger and the older cohort.  
For East German business leaders, the road to top positions in management, 
as mentioned above, was linked to ownership, as it was also the case for the 
younger generation. East German business leaders show the highest propor-
tions of manager-entrepreneurs among the younger generation, but this evident-
ly constrains the possibilities of the younger generation, due to the need for 
equity, in comparison to Poland and Hungary, where the percentages of em-
ployed executives are higher. The situation of the East German business leaders 
is characterized as “lagged generational change” as a feature of East German 
management for a long time (Martens 2008). A short window of opportunity 
developed an unexpected long shadow. 
3.4  Successful Role Taking of the Business Leaders and its 
Implications for Society 
Also, although the former economic cadres had firstly lacked managerial or 
entrepreneurial skills, many of them learned rather quickly. To label it in socio-
logical terms: The new business leaders were quite successful in role taking, 
since most of their firms, which were accompanied during the time span of our 
research, were economically successful. This role taking of East German busi-
ness leaders can additionally be illustrated by analyzing attitudes. Our survey in 
2010 still reveals some differences between opinions of East and West German 
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business leaders, but the variations between them and the population are more 
significant in West as well as in East Germany. 
The greatest contrasts between the interviewed business leaders and the 
population, in both East and West, exhibit the assessment regarding state’s 
regulation on economy. In a representative survey of the German population 
conducted by the Collaborative Research Centre 580 in 2010, about half of the 
population in East Germany advocated an economically and socially active role 
of the state including even policies to redistribute wealth (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schuendeln 2007 published similar results). The population in West Germany 
was more cautious on these issues with an agreement rate of about one third. 
But, even here, a large difference existed in the views of business leaders who 
were predominantly against any state intervention (Table 2). This advocacy of 
the population for an economically active state, albeit with the aforementioned 
East-West differentiation, corresponds to the social “main conflict line” be-
tween social justice and market freedom that is usually displayed in general 
population surveys in Germany. The desire for social justice and protection, 
both of which have to be ensured by the state, is widespread in German society 
(Neugebauer 2007, 58 et seq.).  
Table 2: Approval to Items in the German Population and among Business 
Leaders of Industrial Companies 
Items 
West East 
Business 
leaders Population 
Business 
leaders Population 
The socio-political responsibilities of 
the state can only be achieved 
through the redistribution of wealth 
  6.1% 36.4% 18.7% 54.6% 
Trade unions are superfluous 24.2% 11.2% 41.9% 16.0% 
Free entrepreneurship and social 
justice are mutually exclusive   3.5% 21.3% 10.3% 27.4% 
The state should monitor and regu-
late the economy   6.5% 31.2%   7.1% 50.2% 
Note: The items are selected according to their differentiating power between the two social 
groups and regions. 
Source: SFB 580 general population survey 2010 and 3rd wave of the management panel 
survey, project SFB 580/A2 in 2010. 
 
The commitment to market freedom, understood as the reluctance of the state 
in economic fields, is in contrast a “unifying bond” between East and West 
German business leaders. One can interpret this as an expression of common 
interests on the basis of socio-structural positions and functions. However, this 
does not rule out that East German entrepreneurs and managers have devel-
oped, in their own ways and on the basis of specific experiences, similar views 
as the West German group of business leaders.  
Nevertheless, there are still significant differences between entrepreneurs 
and managers from East and West Germany. Especially the rejection of trade 
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unions by East German business leaders, which is almost twice as much as in 
the West German sample, is striking. Ownership of company shares is accom-
panied by a particularly strong rejection of trade unions by East German re-
spondents. Although the aversion to trade unions in the West German sample 
depends on property of company shares, which matches traditional opinion pat-
terns in industrial SMEs (Berghoff 2006), among the East German owners the 
rejection rate is 60 %, which is twice as much among the West German group 
and the difference compared to the employed executives is, rather pronounced, 
25 %. The combination of regional origin and ownership possesses the largest 
explanatory power for the rejection of trade unions, compared to other features 
(such as the size of the company, the equity ratio as indicator of the economic 
situation of the company and the annual income of the business leader).  
In relation to the population figures two issues are significant (Table 2): 
There are dominant similarities in the response behavior of the East and West 
German business leaders and simultaneously the East-West contrasts appear in 
the responses of the executives that are similarly visible in the responses of the 
population. So the company directors are mostly against redistribution, but the 
rejection of the East German leaders turns out to be weaker than that of West 
Germans (81 % compared to 94 %). Therefore they comply with the tendency of 
the East-West difference in the population (45 % disapproval in the East and 
64 % in the West). Comparable response patterns are detectable in regard to the 
question, whether free entrepreneurship and social justice are mutually exclusive. 
Even in the case of the above-mentioned aversion of East German business 
leaders to trade unions, there is a trend towards a correspondence with the atti-
tudes of the population: In spite of a strong endorsement of redistribution and 
government control, the skepticism of the East German population to the trade 
unions is somewhat stronger than in the West German population. However, this 
East-West difference is not as strong as in the case of business leaders.  
When comparing population and regional economic elites, differences in at-
titudes can better be explained by social inequality, different social positions, 
or contrary interests than they can be attributed to the East-West discrepancy. 
Consequently, the opinion patterns of the population and of the economic elites 
are relatively far apart both in the new as well as in the old federal states of Ger-
many. However, the long-term environmental conditioning does not vanish more 
than two decades after structural change. The East-West differences within the 
population as among the business leaders illustrate this statement. Beyond the 
societal main conflict line, East-West differences are still relevant within the 
sample of business leaders, however, their explanatory power is limited.  
Although specific attitudes can certainly be influenced by both socializing 
influences as well as by interests, the following conclusions can be drawn by 
comparing the differences in attitudes between the East and West German 
population and the attitudes of business leaders from East and West Germany:  
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Insofar as the East-West differences in attitudes are observed among busi-
ness leaders and the general population in the same way, it can be assumed that 
this is caused by the long-term effects of historical development and of person-
al socialization.  
Differences in attitudes between the population and the business leaders, 
which occur in the same way in both regions of Germany, can be interpreted as 
an expression of conflicting interests that correlate with social positions and 
functions. These social variables have a larger impact than the regional ones. 
Similar gaps between population and elites are analyzed with regard to the 
political system (Best and Vogel 2012).  
3.5  Social “Side Effects” of Economic Transformation 
Table 3: Social Background of the Business Leaders, their Fathers’ Education 
and Job Positions 
Goldthorpe 
categories Categories used in survey Poland Hungary 
East 
Germany 
West 
Germany 
Class I 
Higher grade officials; top 
managers in large firms; 
large proprietors; higher 
grade professionals 
38.0% 24.8% 30.7% 34.0% 
Class II 
Lower grade officials; top 
and lower managers in small 
firms; lower managers in 
large firms; lower grade 
professionals 
26.8% 29.3% 22.1% 30.5% 
Class I and II  64.8% 54.1% 52.8% 64.5% 
Class III 
Routine non-manual em-
ployees (sales, administra-
tion, commerce, services) 
    
Class IV 
Small proprietors with and 
without employees; farmers 
and smallholders; other self-
employed workers in prima-
ry production 
12.0% 6.8% 15.7% 16.8% 
Class V 
Lower-grade technicians; 
lower-grade supervisors; 
office workers 
  4.9%   7.5% 10.0%   6.0% 
Class VI Skilled worker 15.5% 25.6% 20.7% 11.9% 
Class VII Unskilled, semi-skilled worker   2.8%   6.0%   0.7%   0.7% 
 Number of cases 142 133 140 285 
Highest educa-
tional degree Tertiary 34.5% 35.3% 26.8% 20.0% 
Highest educa-
tional degree Primary/ secondary school 
28.9 / 34.5 
= 0.84 
16.5 / 45.9 
= 0.36 
48.0 / 6.7 
= 7.16 
53.4 / 11.8 
= 4.53* 
Education PhD   2.1%   2.3%   2.9%   3.0% 
*Secondary education does not imply vocational training in this case, but only education at 
school; Note: Percentages Related to the Total Number of Cases in the National or Regional 
Sample; Source: SFB 580/A2 German, polish, and Hungarian surveys in 2010. 
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The management studies of the Collaborative Research Centre 580 also include 
analyses of the social origin of business leaders in the three transformation 
countries Poland, Hungary, and East Germany (Bluhm and Martens 2014). 
Additionally West Germany can be used for the purposes of comparison. A 
majority of the fathers had positions as higher-grade officials and higher-grade 
professionals (Table 3). More than 50 % has a social origin in the service clas-
ses comprising the higher strata of society (classes I and II of Goldthorpe’s 
scheme, Bluhm and Martens 2014, 117). In comparison, for example, with the 
German society as a whole, the proportion of the service classes I and II are 
two to three times larger in the sample of German business leaders. This holds 
especially true for the highest social stratum, which characterizes 9.9 % of the 
fathers’ social origin of the general German population,3 but about one third of 
our sample of German business leaders (see Table 3).  
4.  Conclusions 
The economic transformation in East Germany (to a different extent also in 
other former socialist countries) allows to draw five “lessons,” concerning 
transformation paths, elite reproduction, windows of opportunity, differences 
between new functional elites and the population, and “side effects” on social 
structure. Do these outcomes of economic transformation provide any infor-
mation about hypothetical developments in North Korea or about reunification? 
Lee (2007, 24) argues about different supposed models of a unifying process 
in Korea and cites a widely discussed South Korean study on possible future 
developments. The four scenarios she mentioned are not restricted to transfor-
mation path B like the German type of unification. Also transformation path C 
could provide a – perhaps fairly improbable – “road” towards unification, be-
cause in one scenario, “unification by agreement,” North Korea is explicitly 
pursuing the Chinese way of development. The other three scenarios are “unifi-
cation by incentives,” “by breakdown of North Korea,” and “by military con-
flict.” The authors of the study assess that the probabilities of the scenarios 2 
and 3 are higher than that of agreement and conflict, nevertheless unifying 
processes which do not resemble the German reunification are thinkable.  
Furthermore, the four described outcomes of the German (or East European) 
economic changes – reproduction of managerial elites, short windows of op-
portunity, quick adaptation to new conditions, and accelerated change of social 
structure – seem to be rather independent of the particular transformation path.  
                                                             
3  The result refers to the German Population Survey for the Social Sciences, Allbus (2008), 
variable v347.  
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The reproduction of the former economic cadres roots presumably in gen-
eral functional requirements of management which cannot be fulfilled other-
wise. Early German expectations of an extended elite import and of a manager 
capitalism in East Germany (the so called “head theory”) and their at least 
partial failure illustrate this supposition. It appears that the economic transfor-
mation is always necessarily dependent on a certain degree of reproduction of 
domestic managerial elites at least on a regional level, and empirical data of 
several transformation countries confirm this conjuncture (Bluhm et al. 2014). 
The short window of opportunity of becoming a business leader at the be-
ginning of the transformation process is a German peculiarity, however it is a 
general lesson that limited opportunity structures, with restrained chances of 
“late comers,” tend to throw expanded shadows in the future (see also the con-
tribution of Ketzmerick 2016, in this HSR Forum). Perhaps those biased oppor-
tunity structures are not avoidable, nevertheless problems connected with them 
exist independently of the transformation path. 
The successful role taking of the East German business leaders provides an 
idea that entrepreneurial skills can be activated rather fast under certain circum-
stances and conditions, perhaps faster than some observers in West Germany 
had originally anticipated. But implications of such successful role taking also 
illustrate growing gaps between functional elites and the population in different 
social systems (see also the contribution of Best and Vogel 2016, in this HSR 
Forum). Such differences between social classes could also come into existence 
by following transformation path C, where the ruling party still requires the 
primacy of politics, like Frank’s example about the growing impact of money 
on social relationships in North Korea shows (2015, 566 et seq.). 
Also further stratification of society, increasing social inequality, and social 
closure do not seem to be an exclusive effect of transformation path A (coun-
tries with unregulated economic transformations) or B (regulated transfor-
mation). Although information on social structures of North Korea is rather 
limited, it can be supposed that the society is recently marked by growing re-
gional and social inequalities (Frank 2014, 299). According to these studies, the 
North Korean transformation path C presumably implies the development of a 
new middle class and societal changes.  
The German reunification was essentially a political endeavor. The sudden 
political change and the speed of the unifying process had large impacts on the 
economy. However, results of the economic transformation in East Germany 
like elite reproduction, short windows of opportunity, successful role taking 
with wider implications for society, and social “side effects” are not restricted 
to certain transformation paths or to the German reunification. In this respect 
they will certainly have some relevance for the Korean situation. 
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